A Context-based Procedure for Assessing Participatory Schemes in Environmental Planning by Berthomé, Guy-El-Karim & Thomas, Alban
 16‐729
	
	
	
“A	Context‐based	Procedure	for	Assessing	Participatory	
Schemes	in	Environmental	Planning”	
	
	
Guy	El‐Karim	Berthomé,	Alban	THOMAS	
November	2016
1 
 
A Context-based Procedure for Assessing Participatory Schemes in Environmental 1 
Planning 2 
 3 
Abstract 4 
The efficiency of participatory schemes in environmental planning is an emerging research 5 
area, and many issues are not solved yet regarding the assessment of such procedures. It is 6 
essential for decision makers to identify improvement opportunities of participatory schemes. 7 
We propose an original procedure to address such issue, through a bargaining model from the 8 
signaling game literature, which accounts for participation design as well as for agents’ 9 
preferences, beliefs and bargaining power. The model is calibrated using qualitative data from 10 
surveys in French local communities involved in municipal solid waste management. Model 11 
simulations are used to test for assumptions on the stakeholder dialogue and explore 12 
sensitivity of game outcomes to structural parameters. We propose a set of performance 13 
indicators to identify the most effective participatory schemes in achieving convergence in 14 
stakeholder positions regarding environmental and land-use planning. 15 
 16 
1. Introduction 17 
 18 
Consultation-based management initiatives have emerged over the past decades as a response 19 
to social and political factors impeding stakeholders to reach an agreement on local projects. 20 
The assessment of their performance is of growing importance for public decision makers and 21 
managers (Ansell and Gash, 2007), in particular because of the need to identify suitable 22 
resources associated with positive outcomes of such negotiations (Wolf-Powers, 2010). 23 
Providing decision makers with a scientifically sound and context-specific information 24 
adapted to their needs is therefore a critical issue. However, heterogeneity in stakeholder-25 
dialogue cases does not facilitate the construction of a common benchmark for guiding 26 
decision makers who may not be familiar with public participatory procedures. 27 
 28 
The efficiency issue in stakeholder dialogues has been addressed with various approaches and 29 
applications (Davoudi and Evans, 2005), with few seminal works focusing on the relative role 30 
of various factors on the outcome of stakeholder dialogues (Margerum, 2002; Beierle and 31 
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Cayford, 2002). Participation procedures and stakeholders’ satisfaction often stand out as the 32 
main drivers of success (Smith and McDonough, 2001). Nevertheless, the literature generally 33 
overlooked a large number of context variables from concertation schemes, while at the same 34 
time the scope of study of local negotiations became more complex (Menkel-Meadow, 2009), 35 
contributing to put forward the importance of context-based aspects of the debate (Braun and 36 
Schultz, 2010). 37 
 38 
The role of such contingent, context-based components of stakeholder dialogue was addressed 39 
by some authors through approaches originating from governance studies (Koontz, 2005) or 40 
negotiation (Raymond, 2006). These studies contributed to shifting attention to political 41 
factors (Walker and Hurley, 2004) and the participation process design (Edelenbos and Klijn, 42 
2006, Ansell and Gash, 2007), and most were taken from the literature on environmental 43 
management and planning. Recent empirical analyses include Ananda and Proctor (2013) on 44 
collaborative approaches to water management in Australia, van Rensburg et al. (2015) on 45 
wind farm planning decisions in Ireland, Skurray (2015) on institutional arrangements for 46 
common-pool resource management. 47 
 48 
A standard approach in the economic literature consists in formal representations of complex 49 
relationships between players, even though relationships between the stakeholder dialogue 50 
and the outcome of the participatory scheme are often difficult to predict using simple 51 
mathematical representations, as acknowledged by Mathur and Skelcher (2007). In many 52 
settings, environmental planning with participatory schemes cannot be reduced to a two-53 
player game with, e.g., environmentalists on one side and the industry on the other, but 54 
include the principal as a third agent (Wolf-Powers, 2010). Motivations for introducing a 55 
third agent (or player) include Chiu and Lai (2009), and Davoudi and Evans (2005) and 56 
Saarikoski (2006) for a three-player game with a principal facing two opposing coalitions. 57 
Moreover, the development of decentralized game models offered an extended perspective to 58 
economists willing to analyze collaborative bargaining. In this literature however, the 59 
relationship between agents does not always correspond to a participatory process. 60 
 61 
In a majority of articles, the principal remains the first “active segment” facing agents with 62 
private information, contrasting with the timing of consultation-based procedures. In the 63 
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latter, messages received by the principal may be distorted (Goltsman and Pavlov, 2008), and 64 
moreover, the principal does not control the way stakeholders behave, or how they will 65 
contribute (centralized or decentralized system). This justifies in particular the need to 66 
characterize the principal’s attitude: neutral or not, but always in reaction to stakeholders. 67 
Moreover, standard negotiation models often allow for the possibility that negotiation 68 
completely fails, an option the regulator or principal tries in practice to avoid at all costs in 69 
local planning procedures. Indeed, stakeholder dialogue always allows for making (little) 70 
progress on some technical or managerial features of the sector or process design, such as 71 
valuing some new categories of municipal solid waste in our application (see below). 72 
 73 
In participatory processes, information transmission is not really costly, there is partial 74 
cooperation and always partial results from the negotiation. These limitations justify in our 75 
view the use of a cheap talk model à la Crawford and Sobel (1982), where information is 76 
transmitted between agents through ordinary, informal signals, before the final decision is 77 
made. Cheap talk can be seen as a way to reach, in some circumstances, more proximity 78 
between parties in a negotiation (Messer et al., 2013). In order to model the interactions 79 
between agents involved in stakeholder dialogue, we consider an original approach based on a 80 
signaling game, formally close to an extension of Alonso et al. (2008). It is necessary 81 
however to augment this model by introducing negotiation power and familiarity among 82 
players, considering a greater variety of dialogue modes. Based on this, the cheap talk 83 
approach can be reinterpreted in such a way that it shares similar features with actual 84 
stakeholder dialogue situations. Although the modeling strategy introduced in this paper is far 85 
from sufficient for representing the complexity of agent interactions, we believe it is an 86 
original methodological step in an effort to explore stakeholder dialogue effectiveness. 87 
 88 
The complex nature of stakeholder dialogues requires a detailed characterization of agents’ 89 
preferences, beliefs, and other drivers of their behavior. An additional contribution of the 90 
paper is therefore to present an original method to calibrate a cheap talk model, including the 91 
major determinants behind negotiation objectives and outcomes, with qualitative data 92 
obtained from field surveys. However, for calibration purposes, we consider not only 93 
information on stated preferences collected from stakeholders, but also revealed evidence 94 
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gathered during negotiation by means of a survey.1 The cheap-talk model is calibrated by 95 
converting such qualitative survey data to numerical values, on each of three selected study 96 
areas. Predictions from the theoretical model are then obtained by a numerical root-finding 97 
algorithm. We consider as an empirical application the case of municipal solid waste 98 
management in France, as an illuminating example of environmental planning where 99 
stakeholder attachments are often clear cut, even incorporating a sophisticated amount of 100 
expertise during the stakeholder dialogue. 101 
 102 
A final contribution of the paper is a method of performance assessment associated with 103 
stakeholder dialogue in environmental planning. Assessing the performance of participatory 104 
schemes is a challenging task, and this paper does not propose a comprehensive and generic 105 
method for evaluating such negotiation-based procedures. Rather, we consider only two 106 
indicators of performance that are relevant to facility siting process in environmental 107 
planning: the degree of convergence in the positions of opposing stakeholder groups, and the 108 
intensity of capital investment achieved through dialogue. We discuss in the paper the 109 
motivation for these indicators in relation with the literature on collaborative policy making. 110 
 111 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the way stakeholder dialogue is 112 
typically used in environmental and land-use planning, in particular in local solid waste 113 
management. We also present in this section the survey method and the study areas: three 114 
French sites concerned with municipal solid waste management. The cheap talk model is 115 
presented in Section 3 with its assumptions on preferences and dialogue modes, and the 116 
derivation of final outcomes. In Section 4, we present the calibration exercise, and we discuss 117 
the model simulation and validation checks. Section 5 concludes. 118 
 119 
2. Stakeholder dialogue in controversial environmental planning, with an 120 
application to waste management 121 
 122 
The upgrading of public services that rely on infrastructure subject to the NIMBY (Not In My 123 
Backyard) phenomenon often gives rise to difficult local negotiations (Feinerman et al., 124 
                                                 
1 The advantages of in-depth interviews with stakeholders are also discussed by Avci, Adaman and Özkaynak 
(2010). 
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2004). Because of comparable difficulties in policy making, the design of participatory 125 
procedures for achieving a collective agreement is not fundamentally different for a wide 126 
range of projects impacting the environment (industrial hub, landscape-modifying 127 
infrastructures, transportation, tourist facility, waste management, water dam, etc.) 128 
 129 
The usual features of stakeholder dialogue in environmental planning 130 
 131 
It is interesting for local planners, when they have the opportunity of designing their own 132 
procedure, to know which participatory scheme is preferable, regarding in particular the 133 
probability of success. Participatory approaches at the local level correspond broadly to a 134 
stakeholder dialogue, and in most developed countries a typical procedure for environmental 135 
planning can be described as follows. Stakeholders are involved in a series of participatory 136 
sessions (public hearing, working group, public event, open forum, etc.) during a process 137 
which can take several years. In practice, the process starts with a proposal from a company 138 
(public or under delegation) in charge of the facility design and/or upgrading investment. 139 
Such proposal is a combination of technical, financial and management options together with 140 
a size of operation, which can in principle all be opposed by (some) stakeholders. 141 
Stakeholders respond with counter-proposals consisting in required modifications on some 142 
components of the project design. If proposals and counter-proposals made by stakeholders 143 
for facility siting or upgrading investments do not converge to a satisfactory outcome for the 144 
majority of stakeholders, then this long and iterative process produces poor results. In the case 145 
of a more successful outcome, then the participatory process succeeds in achieving a final 146 
outcome in the form of a larger set of new management provisions, which have been subject 147 
to negotiation and approval by both sides. In case of real success, the fraction of strong 148 
disagreement remaining among groups is expected to be small. 149 
 150 
Municipal solid waste is often considered an “environmental bad” (Davoudi, 2000; Feinerman 151 
et al., 2004) implying political, economic and cultural aspects (Bulkeley et al., 2005; Wagner, 152 
2011). It is less the choice of the management mode in itself that matters in practice, than 153 
aspects of quality of life and environmental conservation, technical process safety and 154 
efficiency. Management decisions for municipal solid waste are often conditional on public 155 
participation procedures (Petts, 2004). As these procedures can be in practice difficult and 156 
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subject to major sources of conflicts (Wiedemann and Femers, 1993), it is a particularly 157 
interesting sector for exploring the performance of participatory schemes implemented for 158 
environmental planning. 159 
In a way similar to the general procedure presented above, in the case of municipal solid 160 
waste management, an operator in charge of the public service of waste collection and 161 
disposal has at some point in time to upgrade the waste management system on a large area. 162 
In France for example, this operator will be acting on behalf of an association of local 163 
communities in a given district. In cases where the operator faces opposition from local 164 
residents, and/or lacks expertise or space to deal satisfactorily with solid waste, the operator 165 
can initiate a consultation procedure, opening a dialogue period among numerous 166 
stakeholders. 167 
 168 
During the stakeholder dialogue, stakeholders exchange over various aspects of the design of 169 
a project. Such design has a particularly sophisticated nature, as environment-related projects 170 
have typically to deal jointly with several resource flows and are characterized by various 171 
intermediate stages (transformation, transportation, collection, possible marketing of co-172 
products, etc.). Moreover, besides investment in new or upgraded capital stock, management 173 
options may also be modified, e.g., modified procedures for labor management and 174 
supervision, expertise and capacity building. Hence, aspects related to human capital are part 175 
of the project features that are relevant to the dialogue among stakeholders. 176 
 177 
Consider for instance the main issue of dealing with the interdependencies between the 178 
different flows, reclamation and treatment facilities of the waste management system, i.e., 179 
complementarities in the logistic chain. On this aspect, some stakeholders on one extreme will 180 
prefer a single final treatment of waste that reduces coordination problems, while at the other 181 
extreme other stakeholders will be in favor of diversification of industrial solutions, implying 182 
more difficult coordination issues. On the basis of such oppositions among stakeholders, 183 
groups are formed among stakeholders that will defend a project design according to 184 
(presumably fairly homogeneous) internal preferences. Groups are then pushing for outcomes 185 
that remain distinct, but not necessarily far apart from each other at the end of the process, if 186 
successful. 187 
 188 
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Our framework seems to be more consistent with European waste management systems than 189 
North America regarding waste treatment aspects. Indeed, the variety of possible disposal 190 
options is much wider in European countries. According to Hoornweg and Bhada-Tata 191 
(2012), sanitary landfill accounts for about 27 percent of solid waste disposal in Europe but 192 
91 percent in North America, while open dump and incineration represent a significant part of 193 
waste treatment in Europe but are almost nonexistent in North America. This implies that the 194 
planning issue in North America is limited, in the case of solid waste treatment, to the choice 195 
of a landfill site than in the European case. 196 
 197 
Main variables influencing stakeholder dialogue  198 
 199 
Whatever counter-proposals stakeholders are put forward during the process, they are always 200 
related to their preferences or objectives, typically assumed stable private information in the 201 
literature. We consider in this paper that both terms (preferences and objectives) are 202 
equivalent, as we do not explore multiple objectives from the same economic agent. 203 
Stakeholders’ moderation, or on the contrary extremism, in their preferences may determine 204 
whether consultation is worth trying (Krishna and Morgan, 2001; Mitusch and Strausz, 2005). 205 
In the economic literature, the discrepancy between agents’ objectives is the preferred 206 
determinant of the poor quality of information exchange between participants to the 207 
negotiation, even under incomplete information (Goltsman and Pavlov, 2008). As in any 208 
negotiation with participants sharing different objectives, their messages are likely to be 209 
strategically designed for the state of negotiation. Hence, during stakeholders’ dialogue, 210 
private information can be revealed but not necessarily verified.  211 
 212 
Other determinants than stakeholders’ own preferences or objectives are likely to play a role 213 
in the building of their proposals and communication to other stakeholders. As noted by 214 
Ansell and Gash (2007), the stakeholders’ level of commitment to collaboration is related to 215 
the motivation to participate in collaborative governance, the legitimacy of the project, or the 216 
fulfilment of a legal obligation. Therefore, the shared need for negotiation to succeed may 217 
explain the will of participants to reduce the difference between one’s own outcome and the 218 
opponent’s one. The initial state of management or the lack of proper infrastructure may thus 219 
imply some pressure on stakeholders to engage in a dialogue. Another factor may also be the 220 
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distribution of bargaining power or influence across agents engaged in negotiation, which 221 
sometimes plays a more important role in the process than the difference between agents’ 222 
interests (Van Bommel et al., 2009). 223 
 224 
The literature on collaborative bargaining has identified several other dimensions of 225 
importance for analyzing participatory schemes beyond preferences, pressure to collaborate, 226 
and bargaining power. These additional dimensions concern a) the role played by the 227 
principal, e.g., environmental planner in our framework, and b) the type of relationships 228 
between players in the bargaining game. 229 
 230 
First, the principal’s attitude is emphasized as a major determinant for agents to agree to 231 
collaborate (Margerum, 2002; Petts, 2004; Ansell and Gash, 2007). Moreover, the position 232 
granted to the principal and, more generally, whether the consultation takes place in a 233 
centralized or decentralized setting, also matters (see, e.g., Bourdeaux, 2007). In this respect, 234 
Suh and Wen (2009) link bargaining power with the way the game is structured. Second, 235 
familiarity among stakeholders is likely to modify the outcome of a planned consultation, 236 
mainly because of a more transparent bargaining environment instead of a conflict-driven one 237 
(Wiedemann and Femers, 1993; Bouwen and Taillieu, 2004; Braun and Schultz, 2010). 238 
However, the implementation of a more familiar interaction between agents does not prevent 239 
interplay among basic factors, such as non-compatible interests or bargaining power (Lejano 240 
and Ingram, 2009; Maguire and Lind, 2003), or the difficult context of a bargaining procedure 241 
(Nicklin et al., 2011). Besides such other variables, familiarity between stakeholders will 242 
eventually concern the volume and quality of the information shared by stakeholders (Reimer 243 
and Hoffrage, 2006).  244 
 245 
A benchmark for relative performance of participatory schemes 246 
 247 
Building upon the discussion above, we consider the issue of assessing the performance of 248 
participatory schemes in environmental planning, taking as observed outcome a series of 249 
management decisions that has become acceptable to parties. Such outcome is based on the 250 
new components of management project, upon which each group consents to at the end of the 251 
dialogue, rather than obtaining at all costs decisions that are in line with their initial objective. 252 
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We suggest selecting as a first performance indicator the deviation from initial objectives to 253 
final outcomes reached, which may be considered a form of convergence. The gap between 254 
the initial objective and the outcome for each stakeholder group is an indicator of the 255 
concessions made. Another indicator is the intensity of capital stock investment associated 256 
with the final agreed-upon components of the management project. Performance in this case 257 
is expressed as the ability for the participatory process to move away from a dead-end 258 
situation (blocking in practice some components of new capital stock), precisely by reducing 259 
the gap between the management provisions (or outcomes) accepted by each group. Biddle 260 
and Koontz (2014) correlate the outputs from collaborative governance processes with 261 
stakeholders’ participation in the case of watershed-level water quality management. They 262 
show that collaborative processes with stakeholder participation can provide intermediate 263 
outputs of pollution reduction goals that serve as proxies of environmental outcomes. 264 
Figure 1 presents the initial objectives, final outcomes and displacements for both players (B1 265 
and B2). The gap between the final outcomes (A) defines the magnitude of unachieved 266 
concessions between parties, and in a complementary way the investment in capital stock that 267 
is ultimately achievable can be denoted the outcome of the process. 268 
 269 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 270 
 271 
Ultimately, these two performance indicators are originating from the need to upgrade 272 
facilities in an initial situation of poor management performance. The final objective of the 273 
environmental planner may be seen as the performativity (Callon, 2010) of a new 274 
management system and its environmental rearrangement. We follow here Beierle (1999) and 275 
Leach et al. (2002) who recommend as a benchmark for performance assessment the common 276 
social objective arising from a critical situation (a bad initial management state). As noted 277 
above, the participatory initiative may be considered a means to upgrade local management 278 
capacities for solid waste. The initial issue shared by all concerns the improvement of the 279 
proportion of waste taken care of (collection, diversion, treatment) by the community (within 280 
a common waste management network), reducing its undesirable impacts. 281 
 282 
We assume that the common social goal lies somewhere between extreme stakeholder 283 
preferences, as some linear combination of stakeholder welfare objectives. Such social goal is 284 
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not identified however, because stakeholder preferences and the associated weights in the 285 
social welfare function are not observed, and would require dedicated revealed or stated 286 
preference elicitation procedures. Therefore, we can only consider that it is “socially 287 
desirable” that stakeholder positions converge towards each other, even though the final 288 
outcome may not reach a socially optimal position. 289 
 290 
Consequently, a concerted management initiative can be considered successful not only 291 
because it allows for a higher level of acceptable solutions to be possible (investment in 292 
management renewal, A in Figure 1), but also because negotiation allows stakeholders to 293 
partly converge towards the final outcome (stakeholder displacements B1 and B2 in Figure 1, 294 
see Leach et al., 2002). 295 
 296 
The investigation method and study areas 297 
 298 
In order to explore the performance of consultation-based management procedures applied to 299 
municipal solid waste management, it is necessary to conduct a thorough analysis of the 300 
dimensions described above. Instead of considering a large sample of municipalities with cost 301 
of data collection issues, we select a limited number of study areas (three sites), paying 302 
attention to their differences in terms of management modes and intrinsic characteristics. 303 
Some aspects of collaborative participation have to be distinct in order to identify sources of 304 
management performance. However, at the same time, the study areas need to have some 305 
features in common so that some homogeneity in model parameters (and/or assumptions) can 306 
be expected. We first identified the list of all (26) on-going participation-based procedures for 307 
municipal solid waste management in France in 2005 and 2006 (with the support of experts 308 
from ADEME, the French Agency for Energy and Waste Management). Three areas were 309 
selected out of this list, based on criteria such as the existence of a consultation-based 310 
procedure involving several stakeholders who engage in this form of dialogue. 311 
 312 
Study area 1 is located in the central-east region and covers several geographical areas, of 313 
which only one can be considered industrial in nature. The population covered is between 314 
250,000 and 300,000 inhabitants. Study area 2 is located to the south-west and is also 315 
heterogeneous in terms of geographical features, from a coastal urbanized zone to the west, a 316 
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rural landscape to the east, and a population between 200,000 and 250,000 individuals. Study 317 
area 3 is a site located to the north-west of the country and includes only coastal local 318 
communities, with a population a little over 50,000 individuals at the beginning, but the 319 
planning reflection subsequently extends beyond 150,000 individuals. 320 
 321 
To explore the heterogeneity of the population in the three study areas, we collected data from 322 
INSEE (French Institute for Statistics and Economic Analysis) at the district level, to match 323 
the corresponding geographical areas. The population characteristics in the three study areas 324 
are remarkably homogeneous in terms of annual household median income (19,903 euros, 325 
18,542 euros and 18,608 euros for study area 1, 2 and 3 respectively) and income interquartile 326 
range (3.95, 3.96 and 3.87 in study area 1, 2 and 3 respectively). Concerning education, the 327 
proportion of adult population with a higher education degree ranges from 21.62 in area 2 to 328 
22.63 in area 3, and the proportion of adults without any degree is respectively 15.63 in area 329 
1, 15.50 in area 2 and 10.86 in area 3. Only population density is fairly different across those 330 
study areas, with respectively 154.65, 141.00 and 182.47 inhabitants per square km for area 1, 331 
2 and 3. Therefore, the requirement that study areas should be fairly homogeneous (for 332 
parameters to be assumed common) seems to be satisfied. 333 
 334 
Our field survey consisted of two waves: first, a 6-month exploratory survey at the end of 335 
2006, with direct interviews on the three study areas with local managers, scientific and 336 
technical experts; second, at the end of 2008, the main field survey was conducted. It included 337 
about 50 semi-direct interviews, the visit of the major treatment facilities in operation, and a 338 
collection of published material related to the municipal solid waste management project in 339 
the local media, over the period of the dialogue (2000-2008). This information was 340 
supplemented by numerous technical reports (public or for internal use), providing us with 341 
data capturing the diversity of stakeholders and of their positions involved in each study area.  342 
 343 
In all three sites, the stakeholder dialogue runs over 6 to 7 years and shares similar stages, 344 
from the creation of a waste management agency between 2000 and 2002, to the provision of 345 
substantial funding of new waste facilities between 2008 and 2012. In all cases, the dialogue 346 
has been initiated by an elected administrator, playing most of the time the role of the 347 
principal of the game. Thanks to this quasi-ethnographical survey, we were able to distinguish 348 
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between two stakeholder coalitions in each study area, each defending technical and political 349 
objectives (Weible, 2006). Our results on these preference points are consistent with previous 350 
results in Davoudi and Evans (2005), Davoudi (2000) and Saarikoski (2006). Although the 351 
stages look similar across the study area, the actual negotiation processes were fairly different 352 
because of heterogeneous contexts, participatory schemes, and positions taken by 353 
stakeholders. 354 
 355 
Field surveys revealed that stakeholders have different objectives regarding  356 
a) spatial localization of management efforts and infrastructures,  357 
b) comparative technical performance of the solid waste management solutions,  358 
c) management system: internal complementarities in the logistic chain and 359 
interdependencies,  even outside the management area,  360 
d) manageability of health and environmental impacts,  361 
e) quality aspects, and more broadly the motivation to go beyond standard 362 
management practices,  363 
f) information and relations between the solid waste management agency and the 364 
public,  365 
g) financial aspects. 366 
 367 
3. The model 368 
 369 
There are two groups of agents, j=1, 2, each with message jm  and associated outcome jy , 370 
which we normalize according to the standard cheap talk literature: [ ], 1,1j jm y ∈ − . The 371 
model represents a dialogue as a set of agents’ interactions according to a three-stage game, 372 
and we make the simplifying assumption that each group is homogeneous, so that each group 373 
of agents is considered a player. In stage 1, each player identifies its initial objective denoted 374 
jθ . In stage 2, messages { }1 2,m m  are sent by players, either directly to the principal in the 375 
centralised case, or to each other in the decentralised case. In stage 3, outcomes 1y  and 2y  are 376 
observed and the game ends. The main difference between both versions of the game is that, 377 
in the centralized case, the principal determines the preferable outcome { }1 2,y y  from 378 
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messages { }1 2,m m according to her own attitude, whereas in the decentralized case, the 379 
principal leaves the coordination task to the players. In the latter case, the principal expects 380 
players to look for outcomes that are more coordinated than their initial objective { }1 2,θ θ  381 
because players are concerned about welfare improvement from negotiation. In each case, one 382 
can make behavorial assumptions on the principal and/or on the players.  383 
 384 
We assume players’ preferences depend on several aspects: their “selfish” interest in seeing 385 
the outcome as close as possible to their own objective, the need for the negotiation to 386 
succeed, and the consideration for the other player. The second aspect accounts for the loss 387 
each player would incur if an agreement is not reached and the negotiation fails. Presumably, 388 
the more serious the local environmental situation, the higher the probability that players will 389 
find it ultimately necessary to make a compromise. Therefore, each player is also seeking to 390 
reduce the difference between her own outcome and the opponent’s one, which is driven only 391 
by the (selfish) need for negotiation to succeed. 392 
 393 
From these assumptions, the payoff function of payer i, i=1, 2, is: 394 
( ) ( )2 2i i i i iy y yπ θ δ −= − − − − ,   (1) 395 
where 0δ ≥ . The third aspect related to the consideration for the other player translates into a 396 
weighted function of payoffs from both players being maximized. While the second 397 
component of preferences could be considered intrinsic because it refers to the gain or loss for 398 
the player in case final claims are too far apart, the third component is directly associated with 399 
some form of openness typical of concerted (or participatory) setup. More precisely, the 400 
player can be interested in seeing the other player being acknowledged for what he claims as 401 
legitimate, and then receiving a minimum payoff from dialogue, even though this will not 402 
guarantee that her own payoff will not be lower (or higher). Let iλ  denote the weight put by 403 
player i on her own payoff, with 1 iλ−  the weight on the other player’s payoff, which then 404 
represents their consideration for others. Each player would finally maximize 405 
( )1i i i iλπ λ π−+ −  with respect to message im . 406 
 407 
Consider now the preferences of the principal, who can be considered either neutral (in the 408 
same sense as the game-theory) or “soft”, in a sense we define below. The neutral principal 409 
14 
 
puts equal weight on both players; he maximizes 1 2E mπ π +   , with jπ  the profit function 410 
of player j and { }1 2,m m m= . On the contrary, a “soft” principal leaves to each player the task 411 
of expressing the weight or consideration the other player deserves, instead of forming an 412 
objective function based on the principal’s equal consideration for both players. The soft 413 
principal would then maximize ( ) ( )2 1 1 21 1E mλ π λ π − + −   , where 1 iλ−  is the weight or 414 
consideration associated by player i with the other player case. We assume that 415 
0, 1, 2,i iλ− > = (i.e., each player has minimum consideration for the other one). It is important 416 
in addition to note that it is not only the nature of the principal (neutral or not) that matters, 417 
but the perception the players have on the nature of the principal regarding neutrality or not. 418 
Then, there are four subcases of the centralized case to consider: i) the principal is neutral and 419 
considered as such; ii) the principal is “soft” and considered as such; iii) the principal is 420 
neutral but considered “soft” by both players; iv) the principal is “soft” but considered neutral 421 
by both players2. In each subcase, players 1 and 2 determine their best signal to send to the 422 
principal, given the perceived behavior of the principal. 423 
 424 
Our definition of a “soft” principal contrasts with the framework of Calcott and Hutton 425 
(2006), who examine the possibility that principals may be biased against projects (even 426 
efficient ones), and analyze the relationship between environmental liability regime and the 427 
possibility of harsher regulation in regulatory gatekeeping. They show that adopting a soft 428 
liability regime does not compensate in general the regulator’s bias against projects. In 429 
contrast, the principal in our framework may be neutral or soft, but only with respect to the 430 
weights associated with players, as described above, and not with respect to regulation 431 
enforcement as in Calcott and Hutton (2006). However, the possibility they consider of a 432 
biased principal (towards some projects or stakeholders) could be an interesting extension of 433 
our framework. 434 
 435 
                                                 
2 In our model, we assume that the principal treats both players identically, even when he is “soft”, and that 
players perceive the principal as acting symmetrically over both players. It is also possible to consider the case of 
players perceiving differently the attitude of the principal (neutral or soft). Because dealing with all possible 
cases would complicate the analysis, we do not consider such additional case, although adapting the present 
model would be feasible. Instead, we deal only with the presumably more common cases, namely, that the 
principal is perceived identically by both players. Furthermore, as we will show below, differences in those 
dialogue sub-modes have a lower impact on performance as other parameters, so that it is likely that including 
this case would not significantly modify our results and conclusions. 
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Second, consider the decentralized case, where the nature of the principal does not matter. On 436 
the contrary, it is the degree of familiarity of players regarding their opponent that matters. 437 
Player j may believe that the other player has the same “perception” of the situation as himself 438 
or not, depending on whether players are familiar with each other (through, e.g., previous 439 
interactions and experience). If players 1 and 2 do not have reasonable knowledge of each 440 
other, we assume that player 1 believes that player 2 shares with him the system of weights 1λ  441 
for player 1 and ( )11 λ−  for himself. And similarly for player 2, who would believe player 1 442 
to share his system of weights 2λ  and ( )21 λ− . If however, there is some degree of 443 
knowledge between both players, then each player would use this information. For example, 444 
player 1 would still apply weights 1λ  and ( )11 λ− , but would acknowledge the fact that player 445 
2 uses the system of weights 2λ  and ( )21 λ− , and symmetrically for player 2. 446 
 447 
Combining centralized and decentralized cases, we now deal with eight possible dialogue 448 
modes: the principal is neutral/soft and perceived as neutral/soft by the players, there is 449 
reciprocal familiarity/no familiarity across both players, and player 1(2) is familiar with 450 
player 2(1) but player 2(1) is not with player 1(2). In all cases, player j will design his 451 
message in such a way that the receiver will select the best possible outcome for player j. In 452 
what follows, we will make the important (and in our opinion, realistic) assumption that each 453 
player develops, in a symmetric way, an inference upon the inference the other player is 454 
making. We proceed in three steps. First, we characterize the outcomes observed at the end of 455 
the dialogue process, taking as given the inference adopted by players. Second, we 456 
characterize the inference upon which players base their messaging strategy, i.e., the way they 457 
use available information given their preferences and perceptions. Third, we solve the model 458 
for optimal messages and outcomes by replacing inferences by their expression. 459 
 460 
Details of the model solutions are presented in the Appendix. 461 
 462 
4. Model calibration and simulation 463 
 464 
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We first discuss in this section the method used to calibrate our messaging model. Since the 465 
model is based mostly on unobserved preferences, beliefs, bargaining power, willingness for 466 
agreement, the way to proceed departs from usual structural econometric approaches. We use 467 
in-depth qualitative surveys in the three study areas presented in Section 2, to construct proxy 468 
variables for the components of the model, that is, the initial objective of player j, jθ , the 469 
weight placed by player j on himself, jλ  – thus the weight he assigns the other player (1- jλ ) – 470 
and the willingness or pressure for agreement, δ . 471 
 472 
There are eight possible dialogue modes, depending on players’ vision of the attitude of the 473 
principal (centralized case) and on players’ familiarity with each other (decentralized case). 474 
This yields eight additional parameters if we consider the probability associated with each 475 
case. In terms of outcomes, concessions { }1 2,y y  reached at the end of the stakeholder 476 
dialogue process can be considered dependent “observed variables”. 477 
 478 
The calibration of the above parameters is a major effort in the present work, which is 479 
justified in our view by the complex nature of stakeholder dialogue, and by the lack of 480 
empirical data from actual concerted experiences (cf. Kontoleon et al., 2002; Money and 481 
Allred, 2009; French and Bayley, 2011). As pointed out by Thomson et al. (2007), the 482 
performance of planning procedures can be assessed from a quantitative analysis of 483 
components of the dialogue and its observed effects. The usual way of collecting information 484 
on planning procedures is to conduct a direct qualitative survey of stakeholders and decision 485 
makers (including possibly the public). On solid waste management issues, standard 486 
techniques such as the Analytical Hierarchy Process (Strager and Rosenberger, 2006; Ananda 487 
and Herath, 2008), Likert-scale questions (Thomson et al., 2007), or nonparametric test 488 
procedures (Garmendia and Stagl, 2010), have been employed. Collecting information 489 
directly from stakeholders can lead to strategic and cognitive biases (Watkin et al., 2012; 490 
Paolisso, 2002) that can partly be controlled for by using post-survey validity-check 491 
procedures (consistency ratio). 492 
 493 
In our case however, we use interviews of individual stakeholders, but also an overview of 494 
their real options and concessions in the course and at the end of negotiation (see Table 1 in 495 
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the Appendix for examples of data collected). As described in section 2, the calibration draws 496 
on separate but related data sets (as in Masuda et al., 2008). The first data set consisted of 497 
printed documents including exploitation and local planning reports, articles from local 498 
newspapers, promotional material, etc., over the years 2000 to 2008. The second data set was 499 
a group of interviews with all of the relevant participants, and the visit of the major solid-500 
waste treatment facilities. These data sets are then integrated into the same calibration 501 
protocol, which ultimately yields the quantitative results presented in Table 2. We are 502 
therefore in a position to revisit the consistency of stakeholders’ engagement throughout the 503 
negotiation phase. Therefore, for each variable or parameter to be quantified, we first proceed 504 
to select (and order) relevant data to calibrate. We then construct a cardinal notation scale 505 
which is specific to each variable or parameter, and we can assign at the end a score to each. 506 
 507 
According to the existing literature, the discrepancy between groups’ interests is a major 508 
factor for explaining the success or failure of a negotiation. It is a particularly challenging to 509 
quantify the collective objective of each group, and we have seen in Section 2 that this 510 
variable is grounded on seven management aspects considered particularly important because 511 
the most often cited in debates. 512 
In Table 1 (Appendix), we illustrate the calibration method on the example of aspect c) 513 
(Management system complementarities between processes, described in section 2). Table 1 514 
is a significant reduction in size from the original collected data, as it only deals with a single 515 
aspect (out of seven), a single study area (case 1) and only three stakeholders (out of 30) are 516 
represented. A range indicator specific to aspect c) is constructed, by selecting the extreme 517 
positions recorded during the negotiation phase (as in Biddle and Koontz, 2014), from one 518 
extreme (a single process) to the other (multiple and simultaneous processes). These two 519 
extreme indicators are then rescaled to lie between -1 and 1. It is used to locate each player on 520 
the [-1, 1] scale according to his stated options during the negotiation compared to the lower 521 
or upper bound of the range (column Objective in Table 1). 522 
 523 
Since player objectives are expressed or observed several times and on multiple aspects (see 524 
Awakul and Ogunlana, 2002), an aggregation procedure is required, based on the relative 525 
importance of each of their positions. This is the purpose of column Weight in Table 1. 526 
Weighting scales can be constructed for each stakeholder by using ordinal information from 527 
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the survey in order to state whether a particular aspect is equally, more or less important than 528 
another for a given stakeholder (as in Li et al., 2012). For example, decisive and irreversible 529 
votes have more weight than oral statements, even the more so when the latter are not 530 
repeated or confirmed by subsequent actions. 531 
Once preference indicators are computed for each stakeholder, we assign stakeholders to two 532 
groups using a similarity procedure. We perform a parametric significance test on the 533 
difference between the stated preference of a particular stakeholder and the average 534 
preference indicator of his alleged group, to check for inconsistent assignment. In our three 535 
study areas, solid waste industrialists and technical consultants always belong to the same 536 
group (Group 1), and their location within this group is always strong. The public and elected 537 
local authorities are distributed across both groups, and their location is almost never 538 
“extreme”. On the other hand, environmental associations and public planning authorities turn 539 
out to have a fairly “extreme” location when belonging to Group 2. Once groups are formed, 540 
they are considered players in our game, as explained in Section 3. 541 
 542 
The same way as for preferences, we also need to calibrate parameters jλ  representing the 543 
considerations each player has for the other. They are quantified in a similar manner to the 544 
procedure above, by constructing a range of values from salient features reported in our 545 
dataset following the management process. We account for the negotiation power each player 546 
is likely to have (and believes the other player has). 547 
 548 
Another parameter to calibrate is δ , measuring the willingness of players to reach an 549 
agreement. The value of this variable therefore depends on the management and policy habits 550 
and arrangements prevailing on the particular site at the beginning of the dialogue. We are 551 
actually calibrating exclusively the external pressure on players that makes them more 552 
inclined to endorse the final outcome. This is the difference with the “social pressure to 553 
collaborate” of Suzuki and Iwasa (2009), who include also internal factors (such as 554 
interpersonal relationship between stakeholders). In economic terms, such pressure would be 555 
interpreted as a way to offset the “coordination loss” between agents. Parameter values are 556 
then discussed with and validated by communication experts who were involved in these 557 
study areas (a consulting firm on cases 1 and 2 and an independent consultant on cases 1 and 558 
3). 559 
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 560 
Concerning the dialogue modes, we have seen above that we can consider eight possibilities. 561 
The qualitative surveys allow us to evaluate the relative frequency of every mode in the three 562 
areas, each exhibiting a particular combination of these modes. The relative frequency 563 
associated with each mode is distributed in a fairly homogeneous way across cases, between 564 
0.07 and 0.2. From there, we can compute an expected outcome level, using as weights the 565 
empirical relative frequency (rate of occurrence) of each mode. All modes may be 566 
simultaneously present to form a final outcome matrix. In order to obtain a synthetic formula 567 
for the final outcome, we assign to each dialogue mode g, g=1, 2,…,8, its positive weight gβ  568 
such that 
8
1
1
g
g
g
β
=
=
=∑ . We then compute an average outcome – which corresponds to a 569 
particular participatory scheme – as  570 
 ( )
8
1 2 1 2
1
, , , ,
g
g g
g
Yβ θ θ λ λ δ
=
=
Σ , (2) 571 
where ( )1 2 1 2, , , ,gY θ θ λ λ δ  denotes the theoretical solution depending on contextual 572 
parameters and players’ parameters in dialogue mode g. 573 
 574 
We mentioned in Section 2 that our performance indicators for participatory schemes are the 575 
reduction of the gap (“displacement”) between initial player objectives, and the level of 576 
investment observed in the final outcome. As for other variables, interviews and field survey 577 
data are used to quantify these two performance indicators. For the “displacement” variable, 578 
we account for three components: the range of the displacement, the stakeholders’ awareness 579 
or lack of information about what they are giving up, and the reversibility of the displacement. 580 
As far as the level of investment in solid waste management is concerned, we consider four 581 
components: technical, logistic and economic capacity building; organizational, 582 
administrative and legal benefits; new infrastructures or management systems allowing better 583 
outlets for solid waste to be found; new projects of infrastructure or management systems 584 
allowing to reach the same objective. To measure more precisely the importance of these four 585 
components, we use three variables for the calibration scale: the proportion of solid waste 586 
tonnage or of local managers covered, the perennial nature of this capital (following Beierle, 587 
1999), and the degree of consensual dissatisfaction with the way the issue of solid waste was 588 
tackled (penalty for waste export and transportation). 589 
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 590 
Table 2 presents the calibrated values of the parameters of interest, including the outcome 591 
variables and the relative frequency of each of the eight situations. 592 
 593 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 594 
 595 
The model provides us with two types of indicators relative to the performance of the 596 
consultation game: the difference between both players’ outcome level, 1 2y y− , and the 597 
displacement from the initial objective to the final outcome, , 1, 2i iy iθ− = . These two 598 
indicators can be compared with the calibrated outcome variables, namely, the level of 599 
investment in waste treatment and management, and the level of stated stakeholders’ 600 
displacement (in the survey). Such comparison is used as a means to assess the ex post 601 
validity of the model, i.e., by computing a measure of distance between the calibrated variable 602 
from the survey, and the corresponding simulated value from the model. 603 
 604 
Model Simulation and Validation 605 
 606 
In Table 3, we report the calibrated performance indicators, to be compared with our model 607 
simulations. We normalize the outcomes and model simulations by taking area 3 as a 608 
benchmark for results from areas 1 and 2. More precisely, we solve the model for areas 1 and 609 
2, imposing calibrated displacement and investment to equal their normalized value for area 610 
3. Therefore, model validation is only feasible for the first two study areas. The difference 611 
between the stated performance level and the simulated performance level from the model is 612 
expressed as a proportion of the stated performance. As can be seen from Table 3, the 613 
average “error” of prediction is fairly limited (less than 5 percent in all cases). 614 
 615 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 616 
 617 
Finally, to have a better evaluation of the relative contribution of each parameter or variable 618 
of interest in the final performance of the stakeholder dialogue, we compute the elasticity of 619 
the dialogue performance with respect to each parameter or variable. To do so, we compute an 620 
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average performance indicator from the displacement and the investment stated outcomes, 621 
and run the model with a small change (typically, 1E-8) in the parameter or variable of 622 
interest, to estimate the marginal effect. Table 4 reports computed elasticities at the calibrated 623 
values for the three study areas. 624 
 625 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 626 
 627 
Interestingly, elasticities with respect to parameters δ , θ and β are fairly different across 628 
study areas, even though their calibrated values are roughly similar, as other parameters are 629 
naturally different across study areas. The parameter δ  for pressure to cooperate is associated 630 
with the highest elasticity on average, although it is less than the objectives parameter for area 631 
1. The probability associated with the eight dialogue modes does not seem to influence 632 
performance much in relative terms. 633 
 634 
5. Discussion and conclusion 635 
 636 
We have proposed an original model based on messaging (“cheap talk”), to investigate the 637 
performance of participatory procedures on environmental and land-use planning. The 638 
application deals with three French study areas involved in municipal solid waste 639 
management, where stakeholders’ attitudes and objectives have been quantified from 640 
qualitative surveys. The novelty of the approach is to exploit these qualitative data for 641 
constructing quantitative indicators (as proxies for negotiation background and outcomes) to 642 
calibrate the theoretical model of negotiation. The performance of the dialogue is evaluated 643 
by considering two dimensions: the resulting level of investment for waste collection, 644 
diversion, treatment, and the displacement of stakeholders from their initial objectives to the 645 
acceptance of the final outcome. 646 
Comparing the observed outcomes from qualitative surveys with simulated outcomes from 647 
our model, the latter performs well in terms of reproducing the negotiation outcomes. The 648 
model could therefore be of interest for testing the performance of participatory schemes for 649 
land use projects impacting the environment in other contexts. However, it should not be 650 
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considered a tool for predicting outcomes of future negotiation procedures, because of the 651 
required ex post calibration of variables and parameters of interest. 652 
 653 
In terms of the economics of public participation, this analysis is providing us with 654 
interesting evidence. Concerning the performance of stakeholder dialogue in environmental 655 
planning, it is not sufficient to rely on technical expertise or communication experts (policy 656 
options regularly put forward in practice, see Braun et Schultz, 2010). Agents’ perceptions 657 
and their bargaining power are also factors to consider. The discrepancy between agents’ 658 
initial objectives remains a major critical factor, consistent with insight from the economic 659 
literature. In contrast, with little emphasis in the economic literature, the willingness to reach 660 
an agreement, related to local previous critical conditions, proves to be another major driver 661 
of a successful negotiation. 662 
 663 
A contribution of the present paper is to illustrate how economic modelling can contribute to 664 
assess productivity of stakeholder dialogue and negotiation with numerous factors. We 665 
believe it is an interesting complement to several papers dealing with noxious facility siting. 666 
Feinerman et al. (2004) propose a framework for analyzing differences between political 667 
siting and socially optimal locations for landfill. They test in particular whether NIMBY 668 
conflicts can be resolved by democratic political processes where the principal’s utility 669 
depends on social welfare and political rewards. As our paper focuses on the performance of 670 
stakeholder dialogue in participatory schemes with a calibration exercise that extends beyond 671 
residential households as stakeholders, it could provide an interesting extension of Feinerman 672 
et al. (2004). This is also true of Swallow et al. (1992), who propose a general and practical 673 
approach (without empirical application) to the public-choice problem of noxious facility 674 
siting, by decomposing the site selection process in three stages (minimum technical 675 
standards, social selection criteria, and community acceptance). However, these authors are 676 
interested in the role of observed criteria characterizing the three stages above and not in the 677 
assessment of participatory schemes. 678 
Lejano and Davos (2002) propose a theoretical framework to incorporate equity principles 679 
into the optimal siting decision process, with an application of bargaining games to an 680 
incinerator siting. In their model, utility transfers are not feasible and the optima location is 681 
entirely determined from estimates of (cancer) risk for various possible sites. Environmental 682 
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and health risk preferences and perceptions by stakeholders is in fact one (out of seven) aspect 683 
that we consider in the present paper. The way Lejano and Davos (2002) address the risk and 684 
utility issue is however more detailed than ours. Lami and Abastante (2014) focus also 685 
exclusively on the choice of waste treatment technology (neither sorting nor prevention of 686 
waste emission), and they explore more deeply the issue of benefits and costs for the 687 
stakeholders. Finally, Santore (2014) examine in a theoretical paper the ex ante efficiency of 688 
noxious facility siting when communities have heterogeneous preferences over income. They 689 
show that simple lotteries (without host compensation) may be preferred to determine the 690 
community where the noxious facility will be sited. Such analysis is at the community level 691 
and does not include stakeholder dialogue and a participatory scheme, as it is more interested 692 
in efficiency arguments for the decision maker, in a top-down decision perspective. 693 
 694 
The set of papers above mostly consider top-down policies and centralized compensation 695 
schemes, and as the present paper shows, there is room for stakeholder dialogue as a 696 
complementary policy. This paper contributes to the literature on the economics of 697 
stakeholder dialogue by confirming the usefulness of cheap talk models, which have been 698 
recognized to be potentially useful for analyzing private negotiations and public policy 699 
decision at a general level (Farrell and Rabin, 1996). They stand out as potentially promising 700 
in an intermediary space: for analyzing the political economy of highlights in local 701 
environmental planning. 702 
  703 
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Figure 1. Initial objectives, outcomes and displacements 930 
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 951 
 952 
Table 2. Calibrated parameters – Cheap talk model 953 
 
Parameter / Variable Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 
Pressure to co-operate (δ ) 0.31 0.10 0.19 
Objective of Player 1 ( 1θ ) - 0.25 - 0.24 - 0.26 
Objective of Player 2 ( 2θ ) 0.26 0.22 0.32 
Weight associated with Player 1 by himself ( 1λ ) 0.64 0.72 0.59 
Weight associated with Player 2 by himself ( 2λ ) 0.53 0.42 0.52 
Outcome 2: Displacement with respect to initial 
objective 1.125 0.5875 1 
Outcome 1: Level of new capital stock investments in 
solid waste management 1.375 0.833 1 
Relative frequencies    
a. Principal neutral and perceived as such 0.13 0.217 0.166 
b. Principal neutral but perceived as soft 0.115 0.102 0.104 
c. Principal soft but perceived as neutral 0.085 0.104 0.095 
d. Principal soft and perceived as such 0.18 0.137 0.125 
Centralized case (a. to d.) 0.51 0.56 0.49 
e. Familiar players 0.121 0.097 0.133 
f. Non familiar players 0.142 0.158 0.13 
g. Player 1 familiar with Player 2, but not the reverse 0.1 0.066 0.13 
h. Player 2 familiar with Player 1, but not the reverse 0.127 0.119 0.117 
Decentralized case (e. to h.) 0.49 0.44 0.51 
 954 
  955 
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 956 
Table 3. Observed and Simulated Performance Indicators 957 
 958 
 Study area1 Study area 2 Study area 3 
Calibrated displacement 1.125 0.5875 1 
Calibrated investment 1.375 0.833 1 
Calibrated displacement (area 3 as benchmark) 0.278 0.1265 0.253 
Calibrated investment (area 3 as benchmark) 0.232 0.3335 0.327 
Simulated displacement from model 
(prediction error in %) 
0.274 
(1.44 %) 
0.1325 
(4.74 %) 
0.253 
(---) 
Simulated investment from model 
(prediction error in %) 
0.236 
(1.7 %) 
0.3275 
(1.8 %) 
0.327 
(---) 
 959 
 960 
  961 
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 962 
Table 4. Elasticity of Dialogue Performance 963 
 964 
Parameter / Variable Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 
Pressure to co-operate (δ ) 0.383 0.905 0.697 
Objective of Player 1 ( 1θ ) 0.487 0.718 0.577 
Objective of Player 2 ( 2θ ) 0.443 0.704 0.552 
Weight associated with Player 1 ( 1λ ) 0.116 0.018 0.078 
Weight associated with Player 2 ( 2λ ) 0.081 0.113 0.066 
1β  Principal neutral and perceived as such 0.019 0.013 0.018 
2β  Principal neutral but perceived as soft 0.016 0.017 0.018 
3β . Principal soft but perceived as neutral 0.016 0.002 0.016 
4β  Principal soft and perceived as such 0.036 0.004 0.046 
5β  Familiar players 0.050 0.036 0.031 
6β  Non familiar players 0.039 0.018 0.026 
7β  Only Player 1 familiar with Player 2 0.009 0.020 0.003 
8β  Only Player 2 familiar with Player 1  0.007 0.005 0.002 
 965 
  966 
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Appendix 967 
Details of the cheap-talk model solutions 968 
 969 
Final stage: outcomes 970 
In the centralized case, the principal receives the set of messages from players ( )1 2,m m m≡  971 
and makes decisions that depend on the principal’s inference upon players’ objectives 1θ  and 972 
2θ , given m. If the principal is neutral (denoted n), outcome is, for player j, j= 1, 2: 973 
1 2 2
1 4 1 4
C n
j j jy E m E m
δ δθ θ
δ δ −
+    = +   + +
,   (A1) 974 
where –j = 3-j. 975 
If the principal is soft (denoted b), we have: 976 
1 2 , 1, 2 ; 3
4 4
C b
j j j
A B By E m E m j j j
A C A C
δ δθ θ
δ δ −
+    = + = − = −   + +
,  (A2) 977 
where  978 
( )1 2 1 21A λ λ λ λ= − − + , ( ) ( )2 21 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 12 3 , 2 3B Bλ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ= − − + + = − − + +  979 
and 
2 2
1 2 1 2
1 21 2 4 4
C λ λ λ λλ λ
 
= − − + + + 
 
. 980 
 981 
In the decentralized case, each player designs his own message in such a way that negotiation 982 
can be ultimately to his advantage. Let Djy  denote a just about acceptable outcome for player 983 
j from his point of view, adjusted with respect to all messages exchanged during the dialogue. 984 
However, Djy   is not a beneficial public claim for player j during the cheap talk game. Each 985 
player j then opts to select another arguable claim or outcome, denoted Pr imejy . We have 986 
Pr , , 1, 2 ; 3jimej j j j
j j
y E y m j j j
λ δθ θ
λ δ λ δ −
 = + = − = − + +
.   (A3) 987 
 988 
We can see that players account in their proposition Pr , 1, 2imejy j = , for the possible 989 
proposition they think the other player can submit to the principal: ,j jE y mθ−   . 990 
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According to the assumption on symmetric inference discussed above, player 1 for example 991 
has to infer two components when considering 2 1,E y mθ   : [ ]mE ,12 θθ  and what player 992 
2 would infer for 1 2 ,E y mθ   . Using expressions above, player 1 selects 993 
 994 
( )( ) ( )1 2 1 2
, , ,
1, 2 ; 3 .
jD
j j j j j j j j j
j j
y E m E m
j j j
λ δ
θ δλ θ θ λ δ λ θ θ
λ δ λ δ λ δ λ δ λ λ − − −
    = + + +    + + + +
= − = −
.995 
 (A4) 996 
Such formulae are valid when players have a reasonable degree of familiarity with each other 997 
(case Ф). On the other hand, when a player does not account for the consideration perceived 998 
by the other player (case of no familiarity Г), we have for player j, ( )ji λλ −≡ 1 . Player j then 999 
uses this expression both in Djy  and 
D
iy , to obtain an outcome for himself noted 
D
jy
Γ , and 1000 
another for the other player noted Diy
∨
Γ . 1001 
 1002 
Intermediate stage: messages and inferences 1003 
Let us now characterize the way players determine the message they will use in the dialogue. 1004 
During the messaging with the principal or between players, expectations are formed on the 1005 
player’s objective, conditioned on the messages (and in the decentralized case, on the value of 1006 
their own preference in addition).  1007 
 1008 
In the centralized case, player 1 moves in such a way that the principal’s inference regarding 1009 
1θ  ( 1E mθ   1ζ= ) is best for player 1: 1010 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
1
2 2 2*
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1arg max 1E y y y y
ζ
ζ λ θ λ θ δ θ = − − − − − − −  ,  (A5) 1011 
where 1 1
Cy y= and 2 2
Cy y= . Player 2 acts in a symmetric way. 1012 
If players believe the principal is neutral, player 1 will orient the principal towards an 1013 
inference 1
nζ  on 1E mθ    such that: 1014 
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* 1 1 2
1 1 2
1 2 1 21 1
n n n
n
n n n n
W Z W
Z Z Z Z
ζ θ θ= +
− −
,    (A6) 1015 
and similarly for player 2, where 1016 
( )
( )δλ
δλ
+
+
=
j
jn
jW
21
 and 
( )
( )
1 2
1jn nj j
j
Z W
δ λ
λ δ
−
= = −
+
. 1017 
When players believe the principal is soft, player j will drive the principal towards inference 1018 
b
jζ  on jE mθ   : 1019 
*
1 1
b b b
j j ib
j j ib b b b
i j i j
W Z W
Z Z Z Z
ζ θ θ= +
− − ,   (A7) 1020 
with 1021 
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 2 2
4
1
jb
j
j j
A B A C
W
A B D A B D
λ δ δ
δ δ δ λ δ λ δ
+ +
=
+ − + + + −  
  (A8) 1022 
and 1023 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
2 2 2
1 4
1
1
jb b
j j
j j
A B D A C A B D
Z W
A B D A B D
δ δ δ λ δ δ δ
δ δ δ λ δ λ δ
 + − + − + − +    = = −
+ − + + + −  
. (A9) 1024 
In the decentralized case, when player j is familiar with the other player i, he will send the 1025 
following inference: 1026 
*
1 1
j j i
j j i
i j i j
W Z W
Z Z Z Z
ζ θ θ
Φ Φ Φ
Φ
Φ Φ Φ Φ= +− − ,   (A10) 1027 
where 
( )
( )2
j i i j
j
j j
W
λ δ λδ λ λ
λ λ δ
Φ
+ +
=
− +
 and 
( )
( )2
1 1j i i jj j
j j
Z W
λ δ λδ λ λ
λ λ δ
Φ Φ
+ +
= − = −
− +
. 1028 
 1029 
On the other hand, when player j is not familiar with player i, we simply have 1jW
Γ =  and 1030 
1j jZ W
Γ Γ= − . Finally, combining the formulae for outcomes *jy  with those for inferences 1031 
*
jζ , we can compute the final outcomes corresponding to the eight possible dialogue modes.  1032 
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Appendix. 1033 
Table 1. Example of objectives’ calibration: study area 1, debate on aspect c), 1034 
stakeholders 1, 20 & 27. 1035 
 1036 
Sc
al
e 
fo
r 
po
sit
io
ni
ng
 o
bj
ec
tiv
es
  
Single process 
Several processes: one is leading and the others are secondary 
Two processes or more, but several processes possibly to discard 
Two processes or more, but one process possibly to discard 
Combined but prioritized processes 
Combined but not prioritized processes  
Maximum diversification of processes 
Interval: 
[-1, -0.75] 
[-0.75, -0.45] 
[-0.45, -0.15] 
[-0.15, 0.15] 
[0.15, 0.45] 
[0.45, 0.75] 
[0.75, 1] 
 
Extreme case. Invest in a deep diversification of waste treatment and 
reclamation processes, requiring a major effort on coordination and 
complementarity between the various waste volumes and facilities 
Limit: 1 
   
 S
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s 
Major information in the data set Objective Weight 
 
#1 
 
November 2006. For Mr. X., the plan at the end of year 2006, labeled “all 
incineration” remains satisfactory”, he votes in favor (Regional media, 
November 14, 2006). 
 
November 2006. Mr. Y in local community Y (less involved than Mr. X in the 
intercommunal association) claims: “We need to find a site for waste 
incineration and I do not believe in agricultural spreading”, but he will vote in 
favor (Intercommunal association committee, November 2006). 
 
Over the whole negotiation period. Mr X challenges the claim that every 
possible evaluation study has been conducted for the siting of an incinerator. 
He also repeatedly questions the quality of the compost obtained from 
mechanical biological treatment. During the interview: “This plan is definitely 
not better than the one before. I don’t think methanization will work”.  
 
 
-0.85 
 
 
 
 
-0.7 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.9 
 
 
Weighted 
average 
-0.82 
 
0.65 
 
 
 
 
0.55 
 
 
 
 
 
0.5 
 
 
Total 
weight 
1.70 
 
#20 
 
“The commitee of inquiry issues a positive opinion, provided the future of site 
 
 
 
 
Aspect 
under 
discussion 
c) Management system: internal complementarities in the logistic chain 
and interdependencies 
 
 
Values 
 
Extreme case. Reduce coordination and complementarity issues in the 
management system, thanks to a single direct process leading to a single final 
solid waste treatment 
Limit: -1 
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Z is mentioned in the plan, following the achievement of the objectives below: 
A single waste treatment and storage area for the intercommunal association 
of case 1”, 
or: 
“As many mechanical-biological waste treatment facilities as there are storage 
sites» (Public Inquiry p. 220 and p. of Conclusions, September 14, 2007). 
 
Public investigators mention an additional process: the “reversible storage of 
solid waste waiting to be treated” (Public Inquiry p. 7 of Conclusions, 
September 14, 2007). 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
0.2 
 
Weighted 
average 
0.02 
 
 
 
0.75 
 
 
 
 
 
0.1 
 
Total 
weight 
0.85 
 
#27 
 
Beginning of period. The mere creation of the intercommunal waste agency in 
study area 1 would demonstrate, according to ecologist elected representatives 
[Mr A and Mrs. B], “the willingness to set up an incinerator (…), but since it 
would need to be fueled with solid waste, it will not be possible to sort them 
in order to reduce their volume”. Ecologist representatives ask for an 
“objective” study of the intercommunal waste agency in study area 1 that 
would explore thoroughly all solutions for solid waste treatment (Regional 
press media, December 2, 2002).  
Beginning of period. « They propose as an alternative to waste incineration the 
development of waste sorting, methanization and landfills » (Regional media, 
December 2, 2002).  
 
July 2003. Mrs. C is convinced by the methanization process: “Stabilisation is 
interesting because it reduces the volume of solid waste, but it does not allow 
for recycling, while there is a huge deficit of organic matters in the soil” 
(Regional media, July 2003). 
 
January 2007. Web page of the Green Party (ecologists) of the county: the 
intended plan seems to diverge from the orientations of the intercommunal 
waste agency in study area 1. Mrs. B for the Green Party focuses her 
criticisms on the poor ambitions in terms of prevention and reduction of solid 
waste upstream, and on the fact that a recycling-based energy project is likely 
to be abandoned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.35 
 
 
 
 
0.15 
 
 
 
 
 
0.2 
 
Weighted 
average 
0.26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.45 
 
 
 
 
0.2 
 
 
 
 
 
0.35 
 
Total 
weight 
1 
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